We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.
Introduction
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects where each agent is endowed with a set of objects. As an example, one may think of markets where people trade collectibles, for instance stamps, Pockeymon cards, etc.. Other applications (see also Pápai, 2003) are exchanges of equipment or tasks among workers or departments of a firm or an organization. A well-known special case of our exchange model are so-called housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) where each agent is endowed with exactly one object. For housing markets, the so-called top trading rule that assigns the unique core allocation to each housing market satisfies many appealing properties. In particular, the top trading rule is efficient and strategy-proof [no agent ever benefits from misrepresenting his preferences] (Roth, 1982) . Moreover, it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality [no agent is worse off after trading with other agents] (Ma, 1994) . However, this compatibility result does not extend to "multiple object" exchange markets (Sönmez, 1999; Klaus and Miyagawa, 2000) . 1 We are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules. In addition, we do not want any traders to be able to successfully manipulate the outcome to his advantage by hiding or destroying part of his endowment or transferring part of it to another trader who experiences the transfer as endowment improving. We call an exchange rule that is immune to this type of manipulation hiding-proof, destruction-proof, and transfer-proof, respectively. In the context of classical exchange economies, Postlewaite (1979) is the first to introduce and study hiding-proofness and destruction-proofness. He shows that, when preferences are continuous, strictly increasing and strictly convex, hiding-proofness is incompatible with efficiency and individual rationality. He also shows that destruction-proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality. 2 For reallocation problems with single-peaked preferences, Klaus, Peters and Storcken (1997) characterize hiding-proof rules satisfying various fairness and/or consistency properties. In the context of two-sided matching with endowments, Sertel andÖzkal-1 Some recent studies for exchange markets with indivisibilities and multiple assignment problems without endowments that consider strategy-proofness in combination with other properties are Ehlers and Klaus (2003) , Klaus and Miyagawa (2001 ), and Pápai (2002 , 2003 .
2 Thomson (1987) strengthens the former result by showing that the incompatibility persists on the restricted domain of homothetic preferences even if hiding-proofness is replaced by a weaker notion at which agents can consume only a positive percentage of what they hide no matter how small that percentage is. Sanver (2002) and Fiestras-Janeiro, Klijn and Sánchez (2003) analyze the manipulability of men-(women-) optimal matching rules via endowments 3 . Transfer-proofness is also related to the so-called "transfer paradox" (a trader can be hurt by accepting a predonation). Leontief (1936) is the first to demonstrate that the Walrasian rule is not immune to the transfer paradox for two-agent exchange economies. For two-agent economies, any efficient rule is transfer-proof if and only if it is immune to the transfer-paradox.
We demonstrate that, similarly as in other models, efficient and individually rational rules are generally not immune to manipulations via endowments (Theorems 1, 2, and 3). However, we also identify some subclasses of exchange markets where these incompatibilities do not apply: for two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences destructionproofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality (Proposition 1), and for two-agent exchange markets with unrestricted preferences, transfer-proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality (Proposition 2).
The Model

Exchange Markets with Indivisible Objects
Let K be a set of heterogeneous objects containing at least two objects (we allow |K| = ∞). Let 2 K denote the set of all (possibly empty) subsets of K. To simplify notation, we omit the brackets when denoting subsets of K and write, for instance, xyz instead of {x, y, z}. Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents containing at least two agents. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a finite (possibly empty) set of objects E i ∈ 2 K . No two agents own the same object(s). So, an endowment distribution
Each agent i ∈ N has complete and transitive preferences R i over 2 K . The associated strict preference relation is denoted by P i . Moreover, preferences are strict, that is, for all distinct subsets S, S ∈ 2 K , either S P i S or S P i S. Thus, S R i S means that either S P i S or S = S . Agent i's preferences are separable whenever he prefers x to nothing if and only if for any set S not containing x he prefers S ∪ x to S: for all S ⊆ K and 3 Their non-manipulability by predonation corresponds to our transfer-proofness condition.
4 Note that
Together with strictness and completeness of preferences, this implies that for all S ⊆ K and all x ∈ K \ S, Thus, given a preference profile R ∈ R N and an endowment distribution E ∈ E, we denote an exchange market (with indivisible objects) by (R, E).
is possible. All our results remain valid without free disposal.
Exchange Rules and their Properties
An (exchange) rule is a function ϕ that associates with each exchange market
We assume that a rule only chooses (Pareto) efficient allocations: for all (R, E) ∈ R N × E there is no allocation (S i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , S i R i ϕ i (R, E), with strict preference holding for some j ∈ N .
To express voluntary participation or individual rationality, we assume that agents find their allotments at least as good as their endowments: for
For all (R, E) ∈ R N × E, we denote the set of efficient allocations by P(R, E), the set of individually rational allocations by I(R, E), and the set of efficient and individually rational allocations by PI(R, E). 5 For the notion of separability we use here, we refer to Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) .
6 Agent i's preferences are responsive if, for any two sets that differ only in one object, agent i prefers the set containing the more preferred object: for all S ⊆ K and all x, y ∈ K \ S, x Pi y ⇒ (S ∪ x) Pi (S ∪ y). Roth (1985) introduces this notion of responsiveness for college admission problems.
7 Agent i's preferences are additive if there exists a function ui :
Given that individual endowments are private information, an agent may manipulate the outcome to his advantage by hiding, destroying, or transferring part of his endowment.
Given an endowment distribution E ∈ E, an agent i ∈ N , and a subset E i E i , we obtain the new endowment distribution (E i , E −i ) where agent i hides part of his endowment by replacing agent i's endowment E i with E i . Let (R, E) ∈ R N × E. We denote the economy that is obtained after agent i hides part of his endowment by (R, (E i , E −i )).
First, we consider hiding-proofness: if agent i hides part of his endowment E i and pretends to only own E i E i , then he finds his original allotment ϕ i (R, E) at least as good as the set of objects
he finally can consume.
Since an agent could hide all of his endowment (E i = ∅), we deduce the following:
Lemma 1. Efficiency and hiding-proofness imply individual rationality.
Lemma 1 applies to any preference domain, particularly to R a , R sr , R s , and R u . Also, Lemma 1 holds without efficiency (that is, hiding-proofness implies individual rationality) if each object is desirable for each agent, that is, for all i ∈ N , and all x ∈ K, x P i ∅. 8 Second, we consider destruction-proofness: if an agent i destroys part of his endowment E i , thereby reducing it to E i E i , then he finds his original allotment ϕ i (R, E) at least as good as his new allotment
Given an endowment distribution E ∈ E, agents i, j ∈ N , and a subset E i E i , we obtain the new endowment distribution (E i , E j , E −ij ) where agent i transfers part of his endowment, namely E i \E i , to agent j by replacing agent i's endowment E i with E i and agent j's endowment E j with
Third, we consider transfer-proofness: if agent i transfers part of his endowment E i to another agent, say agent j, who experiences the transfer as endowment improving, thereby reducing his endowment to E i E i , and expanding agent j's endowment to E j E j such that E j R j E j , then agent i finds his original allotment ϕ i (R, E) at least as good as his new allotment
As the following examples demonstrate, no direct relationship exists between hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness.
Example 1. No-Trade Rule
On R a , R sr , R s , and R u , the no-trade rule that assigns to each agent his endowment is hiding-proof and individually rational, but neither destructionproof, nor transfer-proof, nor efficient. 9
Example 2. Serial Dictatorship Rule
On R a , R sr , and R s , any serial dictatorship rule that assigns to each agent in a serial way his most preferred set of objects (among the remaining objects) is destruction-proof, transfer-proof, and efficient, but neither hiding-proof, nor individually rational. 10 
Example 3. Conditional Serial Dictatorship Rule ϕ csd(x,E)
A conditional serial dictatorship rule ϕ csd(x,E) is defined as follows: Let x ∈ K and ϕ d , ϕ d be serial dictatorship rules such that for ϕ d lower-indexed agents come first and for ϕ d higher-indexed agents come first. For all E such that
On R a , R sr , and R s , ϕ csd(x,E) is efficient and transfer-proof, but neither hiding-proof (individually rational), nor destruction-proof. 9 Since later we show that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness exists, it is not possible to find an example of independence satisfying efficiency, hiding-proofness, but not destruction-proofness or transfer-proofness. 10 We refer to Klaus and Miyagawa (2001) for a precise definition of serial dictatorship rules. On preference domain R u a serial dictatorship may not satisfy destruction-proofness (e.g., destroying an object may cause a predecessor to abstain from consuming other objects that he considers complementary to the destroyed one). 
is efficient and destruction-proof, but neither hiding-proof (individually rational), nor transfer-proof. 11
Results
Throughout this section, whenever R is fixed, we simply denote an exchange market by its endowment distribution E.
Hiding-Proofness
Theorem 1. For exchange markets with additive preferences, no rule is efficient and hiding-proof.
Theorem 1 holds on any domain that includes the domain of additive preferences R a . In particular, Theorem 1 applies to R a , R sr , R s , and R u .
Proof: Suppose that ϕ is efficient and hiding-proof. Hence, by Lemma 1, ϕ is individually rational. Let N = {1, 2}, E = (E 1 , E 2 ) such that E 1 = ab, E 2 = cd, and (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R N a with utility representation
The only efficient and individually rational allocations are A = (ac, bd) and B = (bcd, a). Hence, ϕ(E) ∈ {A, B}.
Case 1: ϕ(E) = A. If agent 1 hides object b, the endowment distribution becomes E 1 = (a, cd) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is A 1 = (cd, a). So, ϕ(E 1 ) = A 1 . Hence, agent 1 consumes bcd, which he prefers to ac, his allotment at A, in violation of hiding-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) = A.
Case 2: ϕ(E) = B. If agent 2 hides object d, the endowment distribution becomes E 2 = (ac, c) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is B 1 = (ad, b) . So, ϕ(E 2 ) = B 1 . Hence, agent 2 consumes bd, which he prefers to bc, his allotment at B, in violation of hiding-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) = B.
Cases 1 and 2 together show that for n = 2, efficiency and hiding-proofness are incompatible. For n > 2, we simply add agents who prefer their endowments to any possible trade. Since only agents 1 and 2 trade with each other as specified above, the incompatibility of efficiency and hiding-proofness persists for n > 2. 
Destruction-Proofness
If we replace hiding-proofness by destruction-proofness, compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality is possible for two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences. Let N = {1, 2} and (R, E) ∈ R N sr ×E. In order to present a rule satisfying the properties listed above, we introduce some notation. First, for i ∈ N we obtainĒ i by discarding all undesirable objects x, that is, objects x ∈ E i such that ∅ P i x. Second, in order to preserve efficiency, we define the setẼ i by adding toĒ i all objects that agent j = i discarded, and that agent i likes, that is,Ẽ i =Ē i ∪ {x ∈ E j \Ē j : x P i ∅}.
Note that PI(R,Ẽ) ⊆ PI(R, E).
Example 5. Restricted Dictatorship Rule 12 ϕ rd(i)
Let N = {1, 2} and i ∈ N . For all (R, E) ∈ R N sr × E, ϕ rd(i) picks the unique best allocation for agent i in PI(R,Ẽ). We call agent i the dictator. By construction, ϕ rd(i) is efficient and individually rational.
Next, we show that when preferences are separable and responsive, ϕ rd(i) is destruction-proof. 13 12 For n > 2 we can define restricted serial dictatorship rulesφ rd(π) , where π denotes the ordering of "dictators." Similarly as before, we can derive an economy (R,Ẽ) by first letting all agents discard of undesirable objects and then distributing them among the agents who would like to consume them (this distribution can, for instance, be done sequentially using π). Then, for all (R, E) ∈ R N sr × E, the first dictator restricts the set PI(R,Ẽ) to all allocations where he receives his best allotment. Next, if several allocations are left over, the second dictator restricts the remaining set to all allocations where he receives his best allotment, etc.. In order to adjust restricted serial dictatorship rules if free disposal is not allowed, we simply assume that an agent has to keep any object that is undesirable for all agents.
13 One can easily show that ϕ rd(i) does not satisfy hiding-proofness. (1) , and (R, E) ∈ R N sr × E. Note that by definition, no agent i can benefit by destroying an undesirable object x ∈ E i . Hence, it is without loss of generality to assume that (R, E) = (R,Ẽ). We prove that neither agent can benefit from destroying one of his objects. The proof that neither agent can benefit from destroying several objects follows by applying the "one-object-argument" for each object and invoking transitivity of preferences. (B 1 ∪ x) . Thus, C 1 P 1 A 1 , which contradicts the assumption that A is the best allocation for agent 1 in PI(E).
, which contradicts the assumption that B is the best allocation for agent 1 in PI(E 1 , E 2 \x).
2
The class of rules that are efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof for two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences is very large. The following example serves to illustrate the largeness of this class of rules.
The only efficient and individually rational allocations are A = (bcd, a), B = (acd, b), C = (cd, ab), D = (abd, c), F = (bd, ac), G = (ad, bc) , and H = (d, abc). If agent 1 is the dictator, then the restricted dictatorship rule picks allocation A. If agent 2 is the dictator, then the restricted dictatorship rule picks allocation H. Moreover, allocations B and C cannot be manipulated by destruction. Hence, a destruction-proof rule can pick any of the four allocations A, B, C, and H. Therefore, many destruction-proof rule can be easily constructed.
The next example demonstrates that for exchange markets with more than two agents, a restricted (serial) dictatorship rule may be manipulable by destruction. This manipulability result holds for any subdomain of R s that includes the domain of additive preferences R a , in particular R a , R sr , and R s (recall that our definition of a restricted (serial) dictatorship rules only applies to separable preferences so that we cannot make any statements on R u ).
a with utility representation
If agent 1 is the dictator, then the restricted (serial) dictatorship rule picks (cd, ae, b) . However, if agent 3 destroys object e, in the resulting economy the restricted (serial) dictatorship rule picks (bc, d, a) . Hence, agent 3 consumes a, which he strictly prefers to b, in violation of destructionproofness.
The previous example demonstrates that for exchange markets with more than two agents, restricted (serial) dictatorship rules may not be destructionproof. At this moment, it is an open question whether for more than two agents with either additive, or separable and responsive preferences, a rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness exists. If preferences are "only" separable, then we can establish the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness for exchange markets with any number of agents.
Theorem 2. For exchange markets with separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness.
Theorem 2 holds on any domain that includes the domain of separable preferences R s . In particular, Theorem 2 applies to R s and R u .
Proof: Suppose that ϕ is efficient, individually rational, and destructionproof. Let N = {1, 2}, E = (E 1 , E 2 ) such that E 1 = ab, E 2 = cde, and (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R N sr be such that Case 1: ϕ(E) ∈ {A, B}. If agent 2 destroys object e, the endowment distribution becomes E 1 = (ab, cd) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is A 1 = (ac, bd). So, ϕ(E 1 ) = A 1 . Hence, agent 2 consumes bd, which he prefers to a, his allotment at A and ab, his allotment at B, in violation of destruction-proofness. Thus, ϕ(E) / ∈ {A, B}.
Case 2: ϕ(E) ∈ {C, D}. If agent 1 destroys object b, the endowment distribution becomes E 2 = (a, cde) and the only efficient and individually rational allocation for the resulting exchange market is C 1 = (cde, a). So, ϕ(E 2 ) = C 1 . Hence, agent 1 consumes cde, which he prefers to ac, his allotment at C and ace, his allotment at D, in violation of destructionproofness. Thus, ϕ(E) / ∈ {C, D}.
Cases 1 and 2 together show that for n = 2, efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness are incompatible. For n > 2, we simply add agents that prefer their endowments to any possible trade. Since only agents 1 and 2 trade with each other as specified above, the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness persists for n > 2. 
Transfer-Proofness
For two-agent exchange markets transfer-proofness is compatible with efficiency and individual rationality. In fact, restricted serial dictatorship rules (defined in the previous section on the domain of separable and responsive preferences) satisfy transfer-proofness. We first extend the definition of restricted serial dictatorship rules to the domain of unrestricted preferences R u . Let N = {1, 2} and (R, E) ∈ R N u × E. In order to adjust restricted serial dictatorship rules to the domain R u , for j ∈ N ,Ē j is the most preferred subset of E j for agent j, that is, for all S ⊆ E j ,Ē j R j S. Proof: Let N = {1, 2}, ϕ r = ϕ rd(1) , and (R, E) ∈ R N u × E. We prove that neither agent can benefit from transferring one of his objects to the other agent. The proof that neither agent can benefit from transferring several objects follows by applying the "one-object-argument" for each object and invoking transitivity of preferences. Case 1: Agent 1 transfers x ∈ E 1 to agent 2 such that
Note thatĒ 2 R 2Ē2 . Then, by transitivity, B 1 P 1Ē1 and B 2 R 2Ē2 . Hence, by individual rationality, there exists C ∈ PI(E) such that C 1 R 1 B 1 and C 2 R 2 B 2 . Thus, C 1 P 1 A 1 and C 2 R 2Ē2 , which contradicts the assumption that A is the best available allocation for agent 1 at (R, E). Case 2: Agent 2 transfers x ∈ E 2 such that (E 1 ∪ x) R 1 E 1 and E 2 ≡ E 2 \x. Let A = ϕ r (E) and B = ϕ r (E 1 ∪ x, E 2 ). Suppose B 2 P 2 A 2 . Then, by efficiency, A 1 P 1 B 1 . Note that by individual rationality, B 1 R 1 (E 1 ∪ x) . By the definition of ϕ r , A 2 R 2Ē2 R 2 E 2 . Note thatĒ 2 R 2Ē 2 . Then, by transitivity, A 1 P 1 (E 1 ∪ x) and A 2 R 2Ē 2 . Hence, by individual rationality, there exists C ∈ PI(E 1 ∪ x, E 2 ) such that C 1 P 1 B 1 and C 2 R 2Ē 2 , which contradicts the assumption that B is the best available allocation for agent 1 at (E 1 ∪ x, E 2 ). 2
The following is an example of a rule that is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof, but not destruction-proof.
Example 9. Restricted Conditional Dictatorship Rule ϕ
rcd (x,Ẽ) Let N = {1, 2} and x ∈ K. For all (R, E) ∈ R N sr × E such that x ∈ i∈NẼ i , ϕ rcd(x,Ẽ) (R, E) = ϕ rd(1) (R, E) . For all (R, E) ∈ R N sr × E such that x / ∈ i∈NẼ i , ϕ rcd(x,Ẽ) (R, E) = ϕ rd(2) (R, E). Then, ϕ rcd(x,Ẽ) is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof, but not destruction-proof.
The next example demonstrates that for exchange markets with more than two agents, a restricted (serial) dictatorship rule may be manipulable by transfers. This manipulability result holds for any subdomain of R u that includes the domain of additive preferences R a , in particular R a , R sr , R s , and R u .
Example 10. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = (E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) such that E 1 = a, E 2 = bc, E 3 = de, and (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) ∈ R N a be the same as in Example 7. If agent 1 is the dictator, then the restricted (serial) dictatorship rule picks (cd, ae, b) . However, if agent 3 transfers object e to agent 2, in the resulting economy the restricted (serial) dictatorship rule picks (bce, d, a). Hence, agent 3 consumes a, which he prefers to b, in violation of transferproofness.
We next prove that for three or more agents with separable preferences efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness are not compatible. At this moment, it is an open question whether for more than two agents with either additive, or separable and responsive preferences, a rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness exists.
Theorem 3. For exchange markets with separable preferences and at least three agents, no rule is efficient, individual rational, and transfer-proof.
Theorem 3 holds on any domain that includes the domain of separable preferences R s . In particular, Theorem 3 applies to R s and R u .
Proof: Suppose that ϕ is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = (E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) such that E 1 = ab, E 2 = cd, E 3 = ef , and (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) ∈ R N s be such that 
